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Abstract:
We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either
separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution
predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture.
However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when
compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in
the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player.
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21. Introduction
One of the most basic decisions in human life is on whether to cooperate with others or to
rely on one’s own efforts only. An extreme form of cooperation is the foundation of a joint
venture or, in other words, the replacement of individual efforts by a common endeavor. We find
such extreme forms of cooperation as merger in industry, trade unions, political parties, and many
other social groups.
In this paper, we present an experiment in which we examine subjects' behavior in a
situation where they may either opt for a joint venture and bargain collectively or bargain
individually with a third party. Initiating and organizing a joint venture usually includes many
different aspects. The parties involved have, for example, to decide on who does what. This is an
aspect which we neglect in our experiment. We focus on the subjects' decisions for or against
forming a joint venture in a situation with an asymmetry known to all and on their bargaining
strategies with and without the joint venture. The specific purpose of the joint venture is to
bargain with a third party on a contract.
In a previous study (Berninghaus et al. 1998) a simple model of this joint venture problem
is introduced and both theoretically and experimentally investigated. There are two major results.
First, the theoretical solution predicts collective bargaining for some parameter combinations,
while it predicts decentralized bargaining for others. The experimental data, however, do not
reveal the predicted tendencies. Second, the theoretical solution predicts that, due to a basic
asymmetry, one of the potentially merging parties is stronger than the other. In some situations it
is better for the stronger party to vote against collective bargaining, while for the weaker party it is
always better to vote for collective bargaining. This finds expression in the experimental data in
that the weaker party votes for centralization more often than the stronger party.
The model of Berninghaus et al. (1998), similarly to the game-theoretical study by Selten
and Güth (1977), allows for only two possible contracts. This is a highly restrictive assumption
which we abandon in the present study. In our experiments, many contracts are possible.
Furthermore, in order to obtain a richer data set, we apply the strategy method of experimentation.
We simultaneously ask all subjects to give entire strategies for playing the game. A strategy
prescribes the bargaining decisions for both the case of collective and the case of decentralized
3bargaining in addition to the decision for or against forming the joint venture (by its potential
partners).
The potentially merging parties could represent trade union representatives who decide on
whether they bargain collectively or individually on wages with the employers’ representative. The
industrialized countries show large differences in wage bargaining structures. Wage bargaining can
take place at several different levels. At the extreme case of decentralization (as, for example, in
the United States and Canada), firms and employees negotiate over wages and working conditions
at the level of the individual establishment. At the other extreme of centralized bargaining (as, for
example, in the Scandinavian countries), national unions and employers’ associations may bargain
for the whole country. At the intermediate level (as, for example, in Belgium, Germany, and the
Netherlands), we may find sectoral, branch, or industry-level bargaining.
In the macroeconometric literature there is an on-going debate about the impact of the
degree of centralization in wage bargaining on macroeconomic performance and, in particular, the
wage rates in a country (see OECD 1997 for a survey). Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that
there is a hump-shaped relationship. On theoretical and empirical grounds, they come to the
conclusion that both complete decentralization and complete centralization yield lower wage rates
than intermediate situations. But their result could not be replicated by, for example, Fitzenberger
(1995). Up to now, we have not encountered a satisfactory explanation of the impact of the
degree of centralization in wage bargaining on wage formation. The empirical studies face severe
measurement and methodological problems. Obviously, national wage bargaining systems show
differences other than those in the degree of centralization which also need to be taken into
account (see, for example, Traxler and Kittel 2001)
Our experiment may be considered an attempt to deal, in a somewhat abstract way, with
some aspects of the relationship between the degree of centralization in wage bargaining and the
wage rates. We focus on the question of which degree of centralization a trade union would
actually prefer if it could choose among various degrees of centralization and how this choice
affects the bargaining outcome. Our experiment is not designed, however, to test the hypothesis of
a hump-shaped relationship. We compare the cases of complete decentralization and complete
centralization; intermediate situations are not feasible with only two potentially merging parties.
4A theoretical model dealing with the centralization question has also been presented by
Horn and Wolinsky (1988). Their model examines the centralization decision in an industry where
a firm employs two types of workers. The focus of the model is on potential gains from forming a
joint venture. Jun (1989) examines a similar model where the focus is on how the gains are
allocated among the members of the joint venture. Both models resemble ours in having a two-
stage structure where the two groups of workers decide in the first stage on whether or not to
form a joint venture. In contrast to our model, however, the second stage of their game relies on a
non-cooperative bargaining process similar to the one presented by Rubinstein (1982).
In the following Section 2 we introduce our model and analyze it (game-)theoretically. As
in Berninghaus et al. (1998), we use the (cooperative) bargaining solution introduced by Nash
(1950, 1953) to select a unique equilibrium. The experimental design, explained in Section 3,
concentrates on a parameter constellation in which only one of the potentially merging parties
should be interested in merging. In Section 4 we present a statistical analysis of the experimental
data. Section 5 concludes the article with a discussion of the major results.
2. The model
In our experiments there are three players, X, Y, and Z. They can negotiate either in a
decentralized way or collectively. In the case of decentralized bargaining, X negotiates with Z
about the allocation of a "pie" PXZ  = 97, and, independently, Y negotiates with Z about the
allocation of a "pie" PYZ = 97. In case of collective bargaining, X and Y first merge into XY who
then bargains with Z about the allocation of the total "pie" PXYZ = 194. Whatever XY earns is
equally divided between X and Y.
Let i and j be the two bargaining parties; i.e., (i, j) is either (X, Z) or (Y, Z) or (XY, Z). Like
Berninghaus et al. (1998), we rely on a modified bargaining procedure of Nash (1950, 1953):
Each of the two parties k = i, j chooses a demand Dk and a bottom line Bk with Pij ≥ Dk ≥ Bk  ≥ Ck,
and where Ck  (≥ 0) denotes the conflict payoff of party k.
Given the vector (Di , Bi , Dj , Bj) of bargaining choices and the size of the "pie" Pij, a
demand agreement is reached if
5Di + Dj  ≤ Pij
whereas a bottom line agreement is reached in the case of no demand agreement and
Bi  + Bj ≤ Pij
Whereas both parties k = i, j receive their demand Dk in case of a demand agreement, their
profits are determined by their bottom lines Bk in case of a bottom line agreement. If none of these
two agreements is achieved, the two parties end up in conflict with conflict payoffs Ck.
Since the conflict payoffs Ck depend on the pairing (i, j), we write Ck(i, j). We concentrate
on the following situation:
CX (X, Z) = 0 ,
CY (Y, Z) = b ,
CXY (XY, Z) = a + b,
CZ (X, Z) = c
CZ (Y, Z) = c
CZ (XY, Z) = 2c
with
a, b, c > 0 ;  b + c < 100 ;  a + c < 100
Due to the fact that CY (Y, Z) = b > 0 = CX (X, Z), we can say that Y is stronger than X.
To solve this game theoretically, we can consider the acceptance borders as the (only)
essential strategic variables. Obviously, in an efficient equilibrium the bargaining parties must
choose
Bi + Bj = Pij
To select a unique efficient equilibrium outcome as a benchmark solution we rely on the
Nash bargaining solution, which maximizes the product of the dividends (Bk – Ck) for k = i, j.
6For the pair (i, j) = (X, Z) we maximize (BX – 0) (BZ – c) subject to BX + BZ = 97. This
yields
B*X = 48.5 – c/2, and B*Z = 48.5 + c/2
For the pair (i, j) = (Y, Z) we maximize (BY – b) (BZ – c) subject to BY + BZ = 97. This
yields
B*Y = 48.5 + (b – c)/2, and B*Z = 48.5 + (c – b)/2
For the pair (i, j) = (XY, Z) we maximize (BXY – a – b) (BZ – 2c) subject to BXY + BZ = 194.
This yields
B*XY  = 97 + (a + b – 2c)/2, and B*Z = 97 + (2c – a – b)/2
Recall that the payoff BXY, or the conflict payoff (a + b) are to be divided equally between
X and Y. Because a + b > 0 it follows that B*XY /2 > B*X. Thus, the weaker party X has an interest
in forming XY.
In this experimental study, we will consider a situation where the stronger party Y has no
interest in forming XY. The condition B*Y > B*XY/2 has to be satisfied. Given, our parameter
constraints, this implies b > a.
The actually chosen parameters are
a = 12,  b = 24,  c = 11
Table 1 shows the resulting solution payoffs for X, Y, and Z under collective and decentralized
bargaining. In the bottom row we have determined each player’s incentives for centralizing as the
difference of his payoff in the case of collective bargaining and his payoff in the case of
decentralized bargaining. Obviously, of the three players only X has positive incentives for
centralizing. Our benchmark solution, thus, predicts decentralized bargaining.
7Table 1:
Payoffs for players X, Y, and Z under collective and decentralized bargaining,
and each player’s incentives for centralizing
X Y Z
decentralized bargaining 43 55  96a
collective bargaining 52 52 90
incentives for centralizing 9 -3 -6
a
 54 + 42
3. Experimental Design
The experiments were organized at the University of Karlsruhe with students from various
faculties. Each subject was seated at a computer terminal. The experiment monitor distributed
written instructions and read them aloud. Then each subject had to answer at his terminal a
number of questions which tested the understanding of the instructions. Only when all subjects had
correctly answered all questions could the experiment start. Subjects were not allowed to
communicate other than through their decision making.
Each subject was randomly allocated the role of either player X, Y, or Z. Each subject
participated in 20 negotiation rounds keeping the same role. The matchings of an X, a Y, and a Z
player, however, were randomly determined in each round within matching groups of 9 players (3
players in each role). The subjects had complete information about the game, but they were not
informed about the size of the matching group. In each round, all subjects made their decisions
simultaneously and independently. These decisions represented complete plans prescribing
decisions for all situations that might occur in that round.
The X and Y players had to declare whether they wanted to bargain collectively or not.
Furthermore they had to choose an integer demand and acceptance border for individual and for
collective bargaining. Similarly, the Z player had to choose an integer demand and acceptance
border both for the individual negotiations with X and with Y, in case X and/or Y wanted to
negotiate separately, and for the negotiation with XY, in case both X and Y wanted to negotiate
collectively. When all players had made their decisions, it was determined whether decentralized or
8collective bargaining would take place and the appropriate negotiation was effectuated. For
collective bargaining to take place, both X and Y had to vote for it. If only one of them opted for
merging, decentralized bargaining took place. In the case of collective bargaining, it was randomly
decided which of the two players, X or Y, was representing them in the negotiation with Z. At the
end of each round, each player was informed whether decentralized or collective bargaining had
taken place and about his own individual payoff and the payoff of the party he was negotiating
with.
We organized 8 sessions with 18 subjects, i.e., two matching groups, each. Thus, we
obtained 16 independent observations (matching groups) in total. At the end of each session, each
subject was privately paid in cash his accumulated payoff for the 20 rounds. The conversion rate
was 3 pfennigs (0.03 deutsche mark, DM) for 1 experimental currency unit. The average payment
was DM 24.88 for the subjects in the role of player X, DM 26.12 for those in the role of player Y
and DM 47.19 for those in the role of player Z.
4. Experimental results
4.1 Collective or decentralized bargaining
Recall that theoretically the X player has an interest in collective bargaining while the Y
player should prefer decentralized bargaining. As collective bargaining can take place only if both
X and Y vote for it, the solution predicts decentralized bargaining. We observe, however, that (in
the aggregate over all matching groups and rounds) 40 percent of all bargaining is collective. Fig.
1 shows the percentage of collective bargaining in each of the 20 rounds. The percentage of
collective bargaining declines from 41 percent in the first 10 rounds to 39 percent in the second 10
rounds, but this decline is statistically insignificant (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent
level). Of the X players’ votes, 77 percent are for collective bargaining while of the Y players’
votes, 51 percent are for collective bargaining. Thus, similar to Berninghaus et al. (1998), we find
evidence in favor of the prediction in that the X players vote significantly more often for collective
bargaining than the Y players (two-sided sign test, 1 percent significance level).
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Fig. 1: Percent of collective bargaining in each of the 20 rounds
4.2 Bargaining behavior
Table 2 presents the average demands and bottom lines of players X and Y both in
decentralized and in collective bargaining. It also presents the average demands and bottom lines
of the Z players in negotiation with X, Y, and XY. We observe that all demands are significantly
higher than the respective bottom lines (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level). In
other words, all player types in all situations tend to make concessions in that their bottom lines
are below their demands. We observe no significant differences between the demands (or bottom
lines) of X (or Y) players in decentralized and in collective bargaining. Neither do we observe
significant differences between the demands (or bottom lines) of X players and Y players.1 The Z
players’ demands show no significant differences whether they bargain with X, Y, or XY. The Z
players’ bottom lines, however, do significantly differ: their bottom lines in the negotiation with X
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are higher than those in the negotiation with Y, and their bottom lines in the negotiation with Y are
higher than their bottom lines per player (i.e., half of their bottom lines) in the negotiation with XY
(two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level). In other words, the Z players perceive the
Y players to be stronger than the X players, but they perceive the joint venture XY to be even
stronger than the two parties separately. These differences show in the bottom lines rather than in
the demands suggesting that bottom lines are behaviorally more relevant than demands .
Table 3 splits the demands and bottom lines of players X and Y according to whether the
respective player voted for decentralized or for collective bargaining. We make the following
observations (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests, 5 percent level): X players who vote for
collective bargaining demand significantly more than X players who vote for decentralized
bargaining.2 Y players who vote for collective bargaining demand in the collective bargaining mode
significantly more than Y players who vote for decentralized bargaining. This is also true for the
bottom lines. We conclude that X players who vote for collective bargaining think that they should
try to achieve more in decentralized bargaining as well. Y players who are willing to bargain
collectively try to do better in collective bargaining than Y players who are not willing to bargain
collectively.3
Comparing demands and bottom lines (as presented in Table 2) to our benchmark solution
(in Table 1), we observe the following (one-sided binomial tests, 5 percent level): In the case of
decentralized bargaining, X players’ demands and bottom lines and Z players’ demands and bottom
lines in  negotiation with Y tend to be too high while Y players’ bottom lines and Z players’
demands and bottom lines in negotiation with X tend to be too low. In the case of collective
bargaining, X and Y players’ bottom lines are significantly too low, while Z players’ demands are
too high. Generally the bargaining behavior of the different players does not seem to reflect the
strength that our benchmark solution attributes to them.
                                                                                                                                                                                   
1
 Note, however, that in decentralized bargaining the Y players’ demand just fails significance for
being higher than the X players’ demand by p = 0.058.
2
 This is true for their demand as X; it just fails significance for their demand as XY (p=0.051).
3
 Note, however, that we do not know how seriously subjects considered the demands and
acceptance borders for collective bargaining in situations where due to their own vote collective
bargaining could not happen.
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Demands and bottom lines are rather closely located around the equal split of the total
"pie," i.e., 48.5. While the demands of the X, Y, and Z players, in decentralized and collective
bargaining, significantly tend to be above half of the "pie," bottom lines significantly tend to be
below half of the "pie" (one-sided binomial test, 5 percent level)—with the exception, however, of
the Y players' demands and bottom lines (as the XY representative) in collective bargaining. Recall
that according to our benchmark solution, the Y player's bottom line in decentralized bargaining,
the XY player's bottom line, and the Z player's bottom line in the negotiation with X should be
larger than half of the "pie."
Let us define a player's concession as the difference of his demand and bottom line. Table 4
presents the average concessions of X, Y, and Z players in decentralized and collective bargaining.
In the case of collective bargaining we consider half of the concession, or the concession per
player in XY. We observe no significant difference between the concessions of players X and Y and
between decentralized and collective bargaining. Furthermore, we observe no significant
differences between the concession of player Z and players X or/and Y. We observe, however,
significantly higher concessions of Z players in collective bargaining than in decentralized
bargaining (two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 1 percent level). We may interpret this as further
evidence that Z players perceive the joint venture XY as a stronger bargaining partner than either X
or Y separately.
Table 2:
Average demands and bottom lines
player X player Y player Z
X XYa Y XYa X Y XYa
demand
bottom
52.81
45.88
52.90
46.52
54.76
46.62
51.73
44.74
51.68
46.41
50.92
45.63
51.07
43.59
a
 per player
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Table 3:
Average demands and bottom lines of the X and Y players
in voting against/for centralization
vote against centralization vote for centralization
player X player Y player X player Y
X XYa Y XYa X XYa Y XYa
demand
bottom
51.10
45.79
50.27
43.62
53.53
46.87
46.53
39.70
53.22
45.51
53.84
47.24
56.49
46.08
56.73
48.83
a
 per player
Table 4:
Average concessions
player X player Y player Z
toward X toward Y toward XY
decentralized
collectivea
6.93
6.38
8.14
6.98
5.27 5.29
7.48
a
 per player
4.3 Agreements and conflicts
The relative frequency of demand agreements is 27.60 percent in decentralized bargaining
and 28.13 percent in collective bargaining. The relative frequency of bottom line agreements is
60.76 percent in decentralized bargaining and 49.22 percent in collective bargaining. The relative
frequency of conflicts is 11.63 percent in decentralized bargaining and 22.66 percent in collective
bargaining. Table 5 shows the respective percentages separately for the bargaining situation
between X and Z and between Y and Z. There appears to be no difference between them. In
decentralized bargaining, border agreements become significantly more frequent from the first 10
rounds to the second 10 rounds. In all cases, border agreements occur more often than demand
agreements and conflicts. Thus, acceptance borders are behaviorally more relevant than demands.
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Table 5:
Relative frequency of demand agreements, bottom line agreements and conflicts
demand
agreement
bottom
agreement
conflict
collective
decentralized
XY–Z
X–Z
Y–Z
28.13
27.78
27.43
49.22
  60.76a
  60.76a
22.66
11.46
11.81
a
 Significantly increased from the first 10 rounds to the second 10 rounds (Wilcoxon matched pair
signed rank test, 5 percent significance level, two-sided)
4.4 Payoffs
The average payoffs per period realized by the X, Y, and Z players are 41.46, 43.53, and
78.65 respectively. Although the Y players on average gain significantly more than the X players
(one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level), Y players gain only 79.1 percent of their
theoretically predicted profit under decentralized bargaining while X players gain 96.4 percent of
the predicted profit. Z players gain 82.8 percent of the predicted payoff and significantly less than
the sum of the X and Y players’ profits (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level).
Table 6 presents both the predicted and the average realized payoffs per round of each bargaining
party in decentralized and collective bargaining. For the realized payoffs we determine the X, Y,
and Z players’ incentives for centralizing as the differences of payoff in collective bargaining and
the payoff in decentralized bargaining. The incentives are 1.04, -2.40, and -14.83 for the X, Y, and
Z player respectively. Thus, compared to the theoretical benchmark solution, the X players’
incentive and the Y players’ disincentive have become less important while the Z players
disincentive has become more important.
We find significance for the following observations (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test;
5 percent level; all other comparisons show no significant difference): (1) The Z players’ payoffs
per XY player in collective bargaining tend to be lower than their payoffs in the negotiation with X
alone (a) or Y alone (b). Thus, the Z players’ total payoffs in collective bargaining tend to be lower
than their sum of payoffs in decentralized bargaining. (2) In collective bargaining, the Z players’
payoffs per XY player tend to be lower than those of the X players and those of the Y players. (3)
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In decentralized bargaining, the Z players’ payoffs tend to be lower than those of the Y players but
higher than those of the X players. (4) The Y players’ payoffs in decentralized bargaining just fail
significance for being larger than their payoffs in collective bargaining4 and larger than the X
players’ payoffs5. Of these observations only (1b) violates the prediction of the Nash bargaining
solution.
Table 6:
The predicted and average realized payoffs per round
in decentralized and collective bargaining
(the realized payoffs include those in case of conflict)
negotiation parties
(i, j)
payoff of party i payoff of party j
Nash bargaining
 prediction
(X, Z)
(Y, Z)
(XY, Z)
43
55
  52*
54
42
  45*
realized payoff
per round
(X, Z)
(Y, Z)
(XY, Z)
41.04
44.49
  42.09*
42.73
41.85
  34.88*
* per player of party i
5. Conclusion
We observe that in 40 percent of the cases the stronger Y players vote for collective
bargaining although it is not in their strategic interest: not only according to the theoretical
benchmark solution but also in the experiment (although this just fails significance) Y players do,
on average, gain higher payoffs in decentralized than in collective bargaining. We suggest that the
larger number of votes for collective bargaining by Y players might be influenced by an inequality
aversion with respect to the Z players (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 1999). In
collective bargaining, Z players claim less than in decentralized bargaining. Thus, in collective
                                                       
4
 Actually, p=0.051.
5
 Actually, p=0.051.
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bargaining Z players gain significantly lower payoffs than in decentralized bargaining—their
payoffs in collective bargaining still being higher than those of the X or Y players, though.
Demands and bottom lines are located around the equal split of the total "pie." Obviously,
fairness considerations similar to those observed in ultimatum bargaining experiments also play
some part in our experiment (see Roth 1995 for a survey).
X (and Y) players who vote for collective bargaining claim (in collective bargaining) a
larger share of the pie for themselves than those who vote for decentralized bargaining. This
supports the common claim that by forming a coalition a bargaining side may gain in strength
(Einigkeit macht stark!). According to game theory this claim is true only for specific (parameter)
constellations different from the one we use (see Berninghaus et al. 1998). For our particular
model, the benchmark solution predicts a minor loss for Z when X and Y merge (-6). In the
experiment, we observe a loss which is more than twice as great (-14.83).
Our experiment may be considered another test of the Nash bargaining solution. Nydegger
and Owen (1975) and Roth and Malouf (1979) have presented experiments designed to test the
axioms of the Nash bargaining solution. Keser, Rullière and Villeval (1999) also explore the
predictive success of the Nash bargaining solution in an experiment where employers bargain with
trade unions of different sizes. They observe that employers do not adapt their claims to the
union's size as predicted by the Nash bargaining solution. Our experiment allows us, like
Berninghaus et al. (1998), to compare the success of the Nash bargaining prediction in
decentralized and collective bargaining. We observe that the behavior of Z players qualitatively
reflects the strength relation between X and Y in the case of decentralized bargaining. However, in
the case of collective bargaining, the strength of the joint venture is overvalued. One possible
explanation is an "irrational" fear of Z players regarding the joint venture (supported by the fact
that Z players claim less from XY than they claim from X and Y separately). A more convincing
explanation is offered by the Einigkeit macht stark result discussed above. If Z has to bargain with
XY instead of X and Y separately, both partners of the XY joint venture have voted for it.
According to Table 3, those who vote for XY have higher aspirations than the average X or Y
participant. Thus, voting for the joint venture can be seen as the determined self-selection of tough
bargainers. In other words, when XY forms, Z confronts tougher bargaining partners than when XY
16
does not form. This also explains the higher conflict rate in collective bargaining than in
decentralized bargaining.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Timothy Cason for inspiring suggestions and to Claude Montmarquette
for his helpful comments. We benefited from the remarks by participants of the Journées de
Microéconomie Appliquée, Lyon, 1999. Financial support from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, at the Humboldt University Berlin, and
Sonderforschungsbereich 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. Claudia
Keser thanks the CIRANO and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Feodor Lynen Research
Fellowship) for their financial support.
REFERENCES
Berninghaus, S. K., Güth, W., Lechler, R., Ramser H.-J. (1998): Decentralized versus collective
bargaining: An experimental study, mimeo.
Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A. (1999): ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition,
American Economic Review.
Calmfors, L., Driffill, J. (1988): Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic
performance, Economic Policy 6, 14-61.
Fitzenberger B. (1995): Zentralisierungsgrad von Lohnverhandlungen und Lohnbildung in Ländern
der Europäischen Union, Diskussionspapier 20, CILE, Konstanz.
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M. (1999): A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation, Quarterly
Journal of Economics.
Horn, H., Wolinsky, A. (1988): Worker substitutability and patterns of unionization, Economic
Journal 391, 484-497.
Jun, B.H. (1989): Non-cooperative bargaining and union formation, Review of Economic Studies
56, 59-76.
Keser, C., Villeval, M.-C., Rullière, J.-L. (1999): Union bargaining strength as a public good:
Experimental evidence, Working Paper 99-22, SFB 504, Universität Mannheim.
Nash, J. F. (1950): The bargaining problem, Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
17
Nash, J. F. (1953): Two-person cooperative games, Econometrica, 21, 128-140.
Nydegger, R. V., Owen, G. (1975): Two person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash
axioms, International Journal of Game Theory 3, 239-249.
OECD (1997): Economic performance and the structure of collective bargaining, Employment
Outlook.
Roth, A. E. (1995): Bargaining experiments, in: J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth, eds., The Handbook of
Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
Roth, A. E., Malouf, M. W. K. (1979): Game-theoretic models and the role of information in
bargaining, Psychological Review 86, 574-549.
Rubinstein, A. (1982): Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50, 97-109.
Selten, R., Güth, W. (1978): Macht Einigkeit stark?–Spieltheoretische Analyse einer
Verhandlungssituation, in: Neue Entwicklungen in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Schriften des
Vereins für Socialpolitik, N.F. Bd. 98, 197-217.
Traxler, F., Kittel, B. (2001): The bargaining system and performance. A comparison of 18 OECD
countries, forthcoming in: Comparative Political Studies.
18
Instructions
You are participating in an experiment in which you make decisions in groups of three.  In each
group of three there is one participant with each of the functions X, Y, and Z.  Each of you will be
randomly assigned to one of these functions.
In each group of three, contracts can be concluded between X and Z and between Y and Z.  X and
Y can can negotiate with Z individually or jointly.  Contract negotiation takes the form that all
contract negotiators make their decisions known simultaneously and independently of one another.
Each one gives both his/her demand—that is, his/her goal in the negotiations—and the bottom
limit of what he/she just barely prepared to accept.
X negotiates with Z
There are a maximum of 97 experimental currency units (ExCU) to be distributed between X and
Z.  Each negotiator names his/her demand and his/her bottom line.  Both of these must be a whole
number between zero and 97.  In addition, the limit may not be greater than the demand.
If the sum of the demands of the two negotiating parties is less than or equal to 97, a demand
agreement results: each negotiating party receives the exact amount of his/her demand.  If the
sum of the demands made by the two negotiating parties is greater than 97, a bottom line
agreement results: each negotiating party receives the exact amount of his/her bottom line.  If the
sum of the bottom lines is greater than 97, no agreement is reached.  In this case, X receives no
payoff, whereas Z receives a payoff of 10 ExCU.
Y negotiates with Z
There are a maximum of 97 experimental currency units (ExCU) to be distributed between Y and
Z.  Each negotiator names his/her demand and his/her bottom line.  Both of these must be a whole
number between zero and 97.  In addition, the limit may not be greater than the demand.
If the sum of the demands of the two negotiating parties is less than or equal to 97, a demand
agreement results: each negotiating parties receives the exact amount of his/her demand.  If the
sum of the demands made by the two negotiating parties is greater than 97, a bottom line
agreement results: each negotiating parties receives the exact amount of his/her bottom line
amount.  If the sum of the bottom lines is greater than 97, no agreement is reached.  In this case,
Y receives a payoff of 24 ExCU, and Z a payoff of 10 ExCU.
X and Y negotiate jointly with Z
In this situation, only one of the two partners X and Y negotiates on behalf of both with Z.  Which
of the two partners takes on this role is determined purely by chance.  In the following we refer to
the representative of X and Y as XY.  There are a maximum of 194 experimental currency units
(ExCU) to be distributed between XY and Z.  Each negotiating party can name his/her demand
19
and his/her bottom line.  Both of these must be a whole number between zero and 194.  In
addition, the limit may not be greater than the demand.
If the sum of the demands of the two negotiating parties is less than or equal to 194, a demand
agreement results: each negotiating party receives the exact amount of his/her demand.  If the
sum of the demands made by the two negotiating parties is greater than 194, a bottom line
agreement results: each negotiating party receives the exact amount of his/her bottom line
amount.  If the sum of the bottom line amounts is greater than 194, no agreement is reached.  In
this case, XY receives a payoff of 36 ExCU, and Z a payoff of 20 ExCU.
The amount negotiated by XY is divided equally between the two partners, X and Y.  In the case
of a demand agreement, X and Y each receive half of XY’s demand.  In the case of a bottom line
agreement, X and Y each receive half of XY’s bottom line amount.  If no agreement is reached, X
and Y each receive 18 ExCU.
The following table summarizes the individual payoffs for separate and joint negotiation if no
agreement is reached between the respective negotiating parties.
Negotiation
between
                     Payoff if no agreement is reached
                                       for
             X                           Y                             Z
Maximal amount
to be distributed
      X and Z
      Y and Z
   XY and Z
            0
            -
          18
             -
            24
            18
            11
            11
            22
        97
        97
      194
Sequence of events in a round of negotiations
All players make their decisions simultaneously and independently of one another.  They give their
demand and bottom line for both separate and joint negotiation.  None of the players knows at this
point whether the negotiations will be separate or joint.  Negotiator Z gives demand and bottom
line amounts for separate negotiations with X and Y and for joint negotiations with XY.  Under
separate negotiations, Z can aim for different contracts with the two different negotiators.
Negotiators X and Y likewise each name their demand and bottom line amounts for separate and
joint negotiation with Z.  At the same time, they indicate whether they want to negotiate
separately or jointly (mode of negotiation).
As soon as all negotiating parties have made their decisions, it is determined whether X and Y are
negotiating with Z separately or jointly.  Only if both have chosen joint negotiation do they
negotiate with Z jointly as XY.  Otherwise individual negotiations with Z take place.
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If there are separate negotiations, the corresponding demands and bottom lines of the negotiating
parties are put into play.  If negotiation is joint, one of the two negotiating partners X and Y
is randomly chosen as the representative XY.  His/her demand and bottom line for joint
negotiations is put into play along with those of negotiator Z.
Information at the end of a round of negotiations
After a round of negotiations, each negotiator is informed as to whether the negotiations ended up
separate or joint.  If they were joint, players X and Y are told which of them acted as
representative.  In addition, each player is informed of the results of his/her individual negotiations,
i.e., his/her payoff and that of the person(s) with whom he/she negotiated.
Number of rounds of negotiations
You will participate in a total of 20 rounds of negotiation.  Throughout the 20 rounds you will
keep your same function as negotiator X, Y, or Z.  However, in each round of negotiations new
groups of three will be formed at random.  The monetary amounts you gain in each round will be
added up to yield your total winnings.
Payout
At the end of the experiment you will be paid in deutsche marks corresponding to your total
winnings.  One ExCU is equivalent to three pfennigs.
Using the computer program
Press the <F1> key if you want to see an overview of your negotiating strategies and results in all
previous rounds.
With the <F2> key you obtain a short summary of these instructions on your monitor.
In either case, <ESC> returns you to input mode.
Input:
For each demand or bottom line, type in a value and press the <ENTER> key.  If you have given a
permissible number between 0 and 97 (or 194 for joint negotiation), the cursor will jump to the
next input filed.  If you are player X or Y, you must also indicate whether you want to negotiate
jointly or not.  If yes, press j; if not, press n.  After the last input, which is finalized with
<ENTER>, the program checks whether your demands are at least as high as the corresponding
bottom lines.  If not, you fall back into input mode, and can change the incorrect input numbers.
To do so, you can use the arrow keys and the <Del> key, among others.
